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Abstract: Two arguments against the compatibility of epistemic internalism and content 
externalism are considered. Both arguments are shown to fail, because they equivocate 
on the concept of justification involved in their premises. To spell out the involved 
equivocation, a distinction between subjective and objective justification is introduced, 
which can also be independently motivated on the basis of a wide range of thought 
experiments to be found in the mainstream literature on epistemology. The 
subjective/objective justification distinction is also ideally suited for providing new 
insights with respect to central issues within epistemology, including the 
internalism/externalism debate and the New Evil Demon intuition.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Consider, on one hand, content externalism, according to which mental content is externally 
individuated by one’s physical (Putnam 1975) and/or social environment (Burge 1986).1 
On the other hand, consider epistemic internalism, according to which epistemic 
justification must either always (1) be a matter of reasons that are internal to one’s 
conscious psychology and thereby, at least in principle, reflectively accessible,2 or—
formulated more loosely—(2) supervene on things (usually mental states) that are 
internal to one’s mental life:3 viz., Access J-Internalism and Mentalist J-Internalism, 
respectively. 
 Now, however one may formulate epistemic internalism, the point we mean to 
accentuate here is that the commonly received, pre-theoretical intuition is that these two 
views—content externalism and epistemic internalism—do not go hand in hand.4 The 
underlying worry, in short, is that it is prima facie puzzling how a subject S’s epistemic 
justification for her belief that p will be—as the epistemic internalist has it— internal to 
S’s mental life or reflectively accessible psychology, if the very content of S’s belief that p 
is externally individuated—as the content externalist has it.  
 On top of such intuitions, however, there have also been several influential 
arguments towards the same effect. Here we will consider two of them. The first, 
proposed by Laurence Bonjour (1992), targets the compatibility of Access J-Internalism 
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with content externalism. The second, proposed by James Chase (2001), targets the 
compatibility of Mentalist J-Internalism and content externalism.  
 The two arguments are related to each other in that in the same paper Chase 
introduces his own argument, he argues that Bonjour’s fails to establish the 
incompatibility between Access J-Internalism and content externalism because it fails to 
target the sort of justification epistemic internalists have in mind. Not so, he thinks, with 
respect to his own preferred argument against the compatibility of content externalism 
and Mentalist J-Internalism. As we shall here demonstrate, however, Chase’s argument 
turns out to fail on the exact same grounds. Specifically, we will argue that if, following 
Greco (1999), a distinction between subjective and objective justification can be 
motivated, we will soon notice that both arguments equivocate between these two kinds 
of justification. And that if, as Chase suggests in his rejection of Bonjour’s argument on 
the basis of the New Evil Demon intuition, epistemic internalism is concerned only with 
subjective justification, then one may be (subjectively) justified—both in the Accessibilist 
and the Mentalist sense—even if mental content is externally individuated.5 Therefore, 
and contrary to what Bonjour’s and Chase’s arguments have attempted to establish, no 
incompatibility between epistemic internalism and content externalism has been 
established.  
 We begin by outlining Bonjour’s and Chase’s arguments (section 2). Then, in 
section 3, we introduce the subjective/objective justification distinction and diagnose 
what has gone wrong with the two arguments. Section 4 concludes with some closing 
remarks.  
 
2. TWO ARGUMENTS FOR THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF CONTENT 
EXTERNALISM AND EPISTEMIC INTERNALISM 
 
2.1 Bonjour’s Simple Accessibilist Argument 
 
A straightforward argument for the incompatibility of Access J-Internalism and content 
externalism has been suggested by Laurence Bonjour (1992) in a brief passage from 
which we can,6 following here Chase (2001, p. 237),7 extract the following line of 
reasoning:8  
(1) If content externalism is true then there can be an agent A with belief B such that 
part or all of the content of B is not internally available to A. 
	   3 
(2) If agent A with belief B is such that part or all of the content of B is not 
internally available to A, then the justification relations B stands in with other 
beliefs of A’s are not internally available to A. 
(3) If an agent A with belief B is such that the justification relations B stands in with 
other beliefs of A are not internally available to A, then not all factors relevant to 
the justification of beliefs of A are internally available to A. 
 
But, as Chase notes, the consequent of (3) just is the denial of (Accessibilist) J-
Internalism. Thus: 
 
(4) If content externalism is true then J-Internalism is false. 
 
Bonjour’s accessibility argument—an argument wherein premises (2) and (3) are doing a 
lot of the heavy lifting—is a quick way to reach incompatibility between the two views, 
but perhaps it is too quick.  
 One charge that Chase (2001, p. 238) and, more recently, Madison (2009)9 have 
leveled against the argument is that the sense of internal availability (i.e., accessibility) that 
is effectively precluded by content externalism in (1) is, as Chase puts it, ‘not the sense of 
internal availability at issue in characterizing J-Internalism’. And if that’s right, then of 
course the incompatibilist conclusion (4) can be dismissed as a product of illicit 
equivocation. 
Specifically, the equivocation Chase finds objectionable is argued to come out 
most clearly in New Evil Demon-style cases, which—it should be kept in mind for the 
section to follow—were introduced in the literature in order to argue against the 
necessity of the externalist condition that one’s process of forming one’s beliefs should 
be (objectively) reliable. 
To appreciate the objection, think about Stan who is in the ‘bad case’: Stan’s 
belief ‘there is water in front of me’—call this widely individuated belief ‘W’—is, given 
an elaborate deception, false. Moreover, stipulate that on this particular occasion, Stan’s 
belief that W is based on his visual experience that he is currently looking at a lake, along 
with his further (widely individuated) belief that ‘water is the stuff usually found in 
lakes’—call this belief ‘L’. To the contrary, Stan’s counterpart, who is in the good case, 
has a similarly formed belief with the same narrow content, W*, but which is true: in the 
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good case there is no elaborate deception going on and what looks and feels like water is 
water indeed.  
Now, on the basis of this, it may seem prima facie plausible that there should be a 
difference in the justification Stan and his lucky counterpart enjoy with respect to their 
belief W (‘there is water in front of me’). The reason is that, given Stan’s unfortunate 
situation his (widely individuated) belief L, ‘that water is the stuff usually found in lakes’ 
is false and thereby does not concern real water at all. Consequently, L is not 
appropriately related to and thereby cannot confer justification to Stan’s further (widely 
individuated) belief W, ‘that there is water in front of me’, which is supposed to concern 
real water. This, however, should not be a problem for Stan’s counterpart, whose belief 
L is true, meaning that its justification relations to W (which, remember, is supposed to 
concern real water) are just right.  
 Contrary to initial impressions, however, J-Internalists insist—and this is the rub 
of the argument—that victims of evil demon scenarios (such as Stan) are indeed—and 
clearly so, they maintain—no less justified in their beliefs when compared with their 
counterparts (who are in the corresponding good case), despite the fact that the former’s 
beliefs are unreliably formed. That is, so long as it opaque to one that one is in the bad 
scenario, such that one appropriately forms one’s beliefs from one’s point of view, then 
one can be justified in drawing inferences and holding the resulting beliefs, 
independently of the fact that one’s inferences are based on false beliefs. Put another 
way, so long as one’s beliefs are appropriately formed from one’s point of view, it should 
make no difference to one’s justificatory status, whether one’s inferences are, from a 
bird’s-eye point of view, reliable or not. 
This is supposed to be the key intuition that counts against the necessity of any 
condition to the effect that in order for one to be justified, one’s way of forming one’s 
belief must be (objectively) reliable (pace epistemic externalists (e.g. Goldman 1986)).10  
With respect to the present discussion, however, the above intuition indicates that, on 
the Access J-Internalist understanding of justification, the justification relations that the 
widely individuated belief L (‘water is the stuff that is usually found in lakes’) stands in to 
the widely individuated belief W (‘there is water in front of me’) are not factors relevant 
to the justification of S’s belief in W. If they were, then the Access-J Internalist would 
have no reason to claim that there is no justificatory difference between Stan and his 
counterpart: After all, the only difference between the two cases is the wide content of 
the two subjects’ beliefs: Stan’s water-related beliefs are false, whereas his counterpart’s 
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corresponding beliefs are true.  Rather, the justification relations that are relevant are 
those that stand between L* and W*, where L* and W* have the same narrow—that is, 
non-externally individuated—content as L and W.11 Thus, as Chase reasons, what would 
be a factor relevant to Stan’s belief W (‘there is water in front of me’) will be that L* 
beliefs are evidence for W* beliefs, and, crucially, ‘this fact is internally available to S even 
in evil demon cases’ (Chase 2001, p. 238).12  
Thus, (contra (2) and (3) in Bonjour’s incompatibility argument), the following 
conjunction can be true: an agent A with belief B can be such that (i) part or all of the 
content of B is not internally available to A, and yet (ii) not be the case that the 
justification relations B stands in with any of A’s other beliefs—such that A can count as 
being justified in believing B in the Access J-Internalists’s sense—are not internally 
available to A. Thus, on the line Chase advances against Bonjour, new evil demon cases 
suffice to illuminate why it is that (2) in Bonjour’s accessibility argument should be 
rejected. 
If Chase is right, then he will have effectively diffused an argument capturing 
what is perhaps the most straightforward way to articulate the (alleged) incompatibility 
between content externalism and epistemic internalism, at least in the form of Access J-
Internalism.13 As Chase argues, however, we may still be able to show content 
externalism to be incompatible with epistemic internalism when the latter is considered 
in the form of Mentalism.  
 
2.2 The Process Argument 
 
To this end, the Process Argument has been defended by Chase (2001), and challenged by 
Brueckner (2002). To start with, note that according to Mentalist J-Internalism, internal 
duplicates are justificational duplicates, where two subjects are justificational duplicates with 
respect to a proposition p, just in case their justification with respect to p is identical.14 
On the basis of this Mentalist J-Internalist commitment, Chase suggests, we can derive 
the following claim: 
 
Process Claim (PC): For any justificational duplicates, a1 and a2, and proposition p, 
if a1 and a2 believe p, then the ‘justificatory processes’ leading to a1’s belief that p 
and a2’s belief that p are identical. 
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If Chase is right that PC follows from Mentalism, then this would be enough to establish 
premise (1) of the following argument, which he calls the Process Argument: 
 
(1) If PC is false, then Mentalist J-Internalism is false.  
(2) If Content Externalism is true then PC is false. 
(3) Therefore, if content externalism is true, then Mentalist J-Internalism is false.15 
 
Chase, however, attempts to bolster his case for accepting (1) by claiming that PC 
follows from, specifically, the conjunction of Mentalist J-internalism and the ‘natural 
assumption‘ (NA) that the justificatory process leading to a belief is relevant to the 
justification of the relevant belief—a point we’ll return to. The crux of the idea 
motivating (1), then, can be put thusly: If Mentalist J-internalism is true and we have two 
agents who are identical in the ‘internal physical constitution on which their minds 
supervene’, then they will also be justificational duplicates—which is the antecedent of 
PC. And if that’s true then, via (NA), they will also employ identical justificatory 
processes—which is the consequent of PC.  Accordingly, Chase claims, Mentalist J-
Internalism entails PC, which means that if PC is false, then so is Mentalist J-Internalism. 
 Bracketing premise (1) for the time being, let us move on to premise (2). In order 
to establish the conditional claim that content externalism entails the denial of PC, Chase 
needs to show that content externalism (in (2)) is inconsistent with PC. Accordingly he 
offers the following ‘Twin Earth’-style case:16 
 
TWIN SUE: Sue is on Earth. Twin Sue is on Twin Earth. Both Sue and Twin Sue 
reason via the following sentences: 
 
(i) It is possible to drink water 
(ii) Water is liquid 
(iii) Hence it is possible to drink a liquid 
As a result of this reasoning, Sue and Twin Sue believe that it’s possible to drink a liquid 
and express this in the usual way.17 
 
Now, Chase (2001, pp. 241-242) insists that in TWIN SUE, we have a case where, if PC 
is true, then the justificatory processes used by Sue and Twin Sue will be the same:  
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If you believe in propositions, then you could say that Sue and Twin Sue are now 
expressing the same proposition; the beliefs they are reporting have the same content, 
they are the same type belief (although of course not the same belief token). Moreover, 
as in all Twin Earth cases, Sue and Twin Sue are identical in internal physical 
constitution. Hence, by (PC) the justificatory processes Sue has used to obtain the belief 
that it is possible to drink a liquid is identical to the justificatory process Twin Sue has 
used. 
 
The problem, however, is that if content externalism is true, then the above can’t be 
correct: The thoughts operative in Sue and Twin Sue’s reasoning to the belief that it’s 
possible to drink a liquid differ,18 and ipso facto, the justificatory processes they use differ. 
Accordingly, if content externalism is true, PC must be false. Hence what follows is 
premise (2): If content externalism is true, then PC is false.19 And if that’s true then the 
Process Argument seems to go through to its conclusion.  
 What to make of the Process Argument? Does it fare any better than Bonjour’s 
argument in showing that at least one version of epistemic internalism is incompatible 
with content externalism? Brueckner (2002, p. 514) has suggested that both premise (1) 
and premise (2) are problematic and it is particularly interesting, especially for our 
purposes, to see why. 
 With respect to premise (1), contrary to what Chase suggests, PC is not entailed 
by Mentalist J-Internalism: PC is not the strong—controversial—claim that if two 
subjects are internal duplicates who both believe p, then their justificatory processes 
leading to p will be identical. Instead, it is the weaker—and much more plausible—claim 
that if two subjects are justificational duplicates who both believe p, then their justificatory 
processes leading to p will be identical, and this much is entailed simply by the natural 
assumption (NA): Namely, the claim that the justificatory process leading to a belief is 
relevant to the justification of said belief. Accordingly, even if premise (2) is true, such 
that content externalism entails the falsity of PC, this much would not, in turn, entail the 
falsity of Mentalist J-Internalism.  
 But even if premise (1) were acceptable, the Process Argument would still be 
unsound: Premise (2) can be established on the basis of the Twin Sue case only if (as 
Chase suggests) PC does actually have the implication that Sue and Twin Sue employ the 
same justificatory processes. As Brueckner points out, however, only a Mentalist J-
Internalist is bound to accept this; a content externalist will simply deny it. This is 
because, as we explained in the paragraph just above—and, again, contrary to what 
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Chase suggests in his defense of premise (1)—PC is not entailed by Mentalism, and, 
certainly, it does not presuppose it.  
 Accordingly, the content externalist is thus positioned to reason in the following 
way: ‘Granted, both PC is true and Sue and Twin Sue are internal duplicates’. ‘However’, 
the content externalist will further insist, ‘I cannot accept PC’s antecedent that they are 
justificational duplicates, because they are reasoning through different beliefs (water and 
twater beliefs, respectively), in (i) and (ii).’20 ‘And if that’s true’, his reasoning will further 
go, ‘then neither the consequent of PC is true: That is, it is not the case that, contrary to 
content externalism, Sue and twin-Sue have identical justificatory processes.’ 
Accordingly, the Twin Sue case fails to establish that PC and content externalism can’t be 
true at the same time (viz., Premise (2)), and, so, the process argument cannot go through 
to its conclusion.  
 We therefore see that despite its initial plausibility, the Process Argument—no 
less than Bonjour’s accessibilist argument—does not go through. This is because, even 
though it is tempting to assume that Mentalism entails PC or, even, that the latter 
somehow presupposes the former, none of these claims is quite true.  To the contrary, 
PC is a rather straightforward claim that follows merely from (NA) and is compatible 
with both Mentalism and content externalism.  Accordingly, there is no way to argue for 
premise (2) of the Process Argument on the basis of cases like Twin-Sue: Even though 
both the mentalist and the content externalist alike will accept both PC and the claim that 
Sue and Twin Sue are internal duplicates, this last claim will imply they are also justification 
duplicates only for the mentalist—the content externalist can and will outright deny this. 
In other words, when it comes to deciding whether Sue and Twin Sue are justificational 
duplicates—such that we can demonstrate via PC whether they also employ the same 
justificatory processes—the mentalist and the content externalist will be talking past each 
other, which can only mean one thing: Just as Bonjour’s argument, so Chase’s argument 
reveals an equivocation about the possible concepts of justification in play.  
 
3. THE SUBJECTIVE/OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION DISTINCTION 
 
What, then, might be the cause underlying the content externalist and epistemic 
internalist’s equivocation about ‘justification’, in both Bonjour’s and Chase’s arguments? 
The answer, we want to suggest, can be traced back to the intuitions driving the familiar 
debate between epistemic internalism and externalism. Epistemic internalists—and 
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notice that both Accessibilist and Mentalist J-Internalists belong to this category—have 
traditionally assumed that whatever justifies a subject’s belief is to be entirely determined 
by factors that are internal to the subject’s conscious or non-conscious psychology, 
depending on whether one will take the accessibilist or mentalist turn, respectively. To 
the contrary, epistemic externalism—a view that content externalists will, most likely, feel 
more comfortable with—says that the justification of a belief is not entirely determined 
by factors that are internal to the believer’s perspective.  
 In other words, epistemic internalists have been traditionally inclined to fixate 
solely on what is internal to the epistemic agent’s psychology, whereas epistemic 
externalists have tried to downplay the importance of the ‘internal’. In fact, the latter go, 
sometimes, so far as to deny that the internal aspects of one’s psychology are even 
relevant to one’s justification. Consider, for example, reliabilism—arguably the most 
representative theory of epistemic externalism—according to which, in order to be 
justified in believing a proposition (and thereby know it, if true) one does not need to 
know, be justified in believing or even believe that the way one formed one’s belief is 
reliable. Instead, on the reliabilist proposal, one counts as justified merely by having his 
belief formed via a process that is in fact reliable, no matter whether one is aware or has 
any beliefs to the effect that this is so.  
 Reliabilism, of course, is a controversial thesis.21 Focusing on it for a while, 
however, and juxtaposing it with epistemic internalism can bring to the fore several 
intuitions with respect to the concept of justification. Specifically, it can bring to the fore 
certain apparently opposing intuitions that seem to have been implicitly fueling the 
epistemic internalism/externalism debate.22 
 The New Evil demon intuition, for example, was introduced in the literature in 
order to argue against the claim that reliability is a necessary condition on justification; if 
both the deceived agent and the agent whose beliefs are reliably formed count, 
intuitively, as equally justified, then why assume that reliability is even necessary for 
justification?  Now, admittedly this is an intuition that maybe not everyone shares. And 
even if one does share the intuition, one may still not be convinced by what it is 
supposed to demonstrate—that is, that reliability is not a necessary condition on 
justification. In any case, leaving this intuition aside for the moment (we will return to it 
soon), standard process reliabilism still appears problematic.  
 Greco (1999), for example, has argued that by making de facto reliability sufficient 
for justification (and thereby for knowledge too—provided one’s belief is also true), 
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reliabilism seems to be missing an important dimension of our epistemic nature. 
“Sometimes”, as Greco notes (1999, p. 285), “this intuition is expressed by insisting that 
knowledge requires subjective justification. It is not enough that one’s belief is formed in a 
way that is objectively reliable; one’s belief must be formed in a way that is subjectively 
appropriate as well.” One, that is, must be in some relevant sense aware that one’s belief 
is formed in the right way.23 
 In other words, Greco—an epistemic externalist himself—recognizes the 
importance of accommodating a core internalist intuition about justification. And in 
order to reconcile the two views’ seemingly opposing intuitions on justification, he is 
cautious to not speak about justification simpliciter but, instead, introduce a distinction 
between subjective and objective justification. The objective justification an agent’s belief 
enjoys will be a matter of whether the agent is justified from an objective—bird’s eye—
point of view, no matter whether the agent is in any way aware that this is so. Subjective 
justification, on the other hand, refers to whether the agent is, or at least can become, 
somehow aware—from her point of view—whether her beliefs are reliably, or—even 
weaker—not unreliably, formed.24 On the basis of this distinction, we can then say that 
epistemic internalists have been fixating on subjective justification—with the aspiration 
to account for it exclusively in terms of factors that are internal to the agent’s (conscious 
or non-conscious) psychology, whereas reliabilists have insisted that what matters is 
objective justification. As with most cases, however, the middle path is most likely the 
best to take, which also explains why both extremes may at times appear intuitive: In 
order to be fully justified, such that one’s belief can, if true, count as known, one must be both 
subjectively and objectively justified. 
We can easily clarify and motivate this claim by considering some of the classic 
thought experiments to be found in the literature on mainstream epistemology. Suppose, 
following Pritchard’s  (2009, 11) gloss on Chisholm’s (1977) classic case, that ‘Roddy’ 
believes that there is a sheep in the field because he is looking at a sheep-shaped dog. 
Even though his belief is both true (as luck would have it there is a sheep hidden behind 
the sheep-shaped dog) and ‘justified’ (he is looking at something that looks just like a 
sheep, after all), he still lacks knowledge of the relevant proposition. How so? We can say 
that even though he is subjectively justified—there is nothing wrong with the way he forms 
his belief from his point of view, such that he is not epistemically culpable—he is not 
fully justified, because he is not objectively justified: His (total) justificatory process is not 
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objectively reliable because the input to his belief-forming process, in this unfortunate 
case, is defective.25  
Similarly consider ‘Barney’ who forms the belief that he is looking at a real barn 
by taking a look at a real barn.26 Unbeknownst to him, however, he is in a barn-facade 
country, where every object that looks like a barn—save the one he is currently looking 
at—is a convincing fake. Again, his belief is ‘justified’ and true, but it does not amount to 
knowledge. A compelling reason, we want to suggest, is that even though his belief is 
subjectively justified (not only is there nothing wrong from Barney’s point of view, but it is 
actually formed in a way that is as appropriate as it could ever be to Barney’s 
knowledge)27 he is not fully justified. The reason is that Barney is not objectively justified, 
because even though, in his case, the input to his belief-forming process is appropriate, 
his otherwise normally reliable belief-forming process is unreliable in the environment he 
finds himself in.28 Accordingly, his (total) justificatory process is not objectively reliable.29 
Or consider Plantinga’s (1993, p. 192) famous brain lesion case, whereby the 
agent has developed a rare brain lesion, one side effect of which is to reliably cause the 
true belief that one has a brain lesion. This is a case, where even though the agent’s 
justificatory process is objectively reliable, meaning that the agent is objectively justified, he 
nevertheless lacks knowledge. The reason is that, again, the agent fails to be fully justified, 
only, this time, on account of failing to be subjectively justified: From his point of view the 
justificatory process is so strange—no good epistemic agent takes himself to be justified 
in believing he has a brain lesion, if the belief happens to spring in his mind out of the 
blue—that it is entirely inappropriate to believe the relevant output on its basis.30  
And similarly for the Careless Math Student (Greco 2010, p. 152), who chooses 
to solve a mathematical problem on the basis of the correct algorithm, which she 
nevertheless chooses on a whim. Even though his justificatory process is objectively 
reliable such that he is objectively justified (and will thereby receive a good mark on the 
exam), he still lacks knowledge of the answer to the relevant problem. The reason, we 
want to suggest again, is that the Careless Math Student is not fully justified, because he 
fails to be subjectively justified: He has no understanding that the algorithm is the correct 
one, meaning that in similar circumstances he could just as well have chosen one that is 
incorrect. So, from his point of view, he is in no sense aware that the relevant 
justificatory process is appropriate.31  
We therefore see that there is much to recommend an appeal to the suggested 
distinction between subjective and objective justification in order to make sense of a 
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variety of cases within mainstream epistemology. We further want to suggest, however, 
that it can also be used with respect to two more cases that are central to the present 
discussion.  
First, distinguishing between subjective and objective justification can shed 
significant light on the controversial New Evil Demon intuition that Chase appeals to in 
order to explain why Bonjour’s argument fails to demonstrate an incompatibility between 
content externalism and the sort of justification that epistemic internalists have in mind. 
Specifically, we can say that if the New Evil Demon intuition is indeed a guide to the sort 
of justification that epistemic internalists are concerned with, then, indeed, just as we 
claimed above, epistemic internalists are only interested in subjective justification. 
Accordingly, in the case of Stan, we can make the following claim: If the 
evidential relations between L* and W* (remember: L* and W* are supposed to have the 
same narrow—that is, non-externally individuated—content as L and W) are sufficient 
for Stan to be ‘justified’ in believing W, on the epistemic internalist’s view, then Stan can 
only count as subjectively justified: His belief is indeed appropriately formed from his point 
of view, but it is not formed in an objectively reliable way; his (total) justificatory process, 
we may say, is not reliable, because even though his belief-forming process is 
appropriate, the input that goes in it is incorrect. Now the reason this is important in the 
case of doing away with the incompatibility claim between content externalism and 
epistemic internalism is that by so distinguishing between subjective and objective 
justification we can be clear about the specific sense in which one can count as justified 
(in the Access J-Internalist use of the term) even if content externalism is true: Stan is 
subjectively justified despite the fact that he is the victim of the evil demon.32  
Overall then, if epistemic internalism is only interested in subjective justification 
and not justification simpliciter, there should be no in principle tension between the New 
Evil Demon intuition (as deployed by epistemic internalists) and reliabilism. Presumably, 
the reliabilist can claim that even though Stan is subjectively justified, he is not justified 
in their (objective) sense of the term. Therefore, the New Evil Demon intuition fails to 
establish that reliability is not necessary for objective justification, which is the kind of 
justification that is necessary for knowledge.  
Nevertheless, following Greco, it seems to us that the right thing to claim is that 
even though neither epistemic internalism nor reliabilism are correct, both of their 
underlying intuitions are correct: In order to be fully justified such that one can take 
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one’s self to know a true proposition, one needs be both subjectively and objectively 
justified with respect to it.  
Second, the subjective/objective justification distinction can be used in order to 
see why the epistemic internalist and content externalist are bound to talk past each other 
when it comes to interpreting PC in Chase’s argument. That is, Sue and Twin Sue both 
are and are not justificational duplicates, depending on the notion of justification one has 
in mind.  
If it is subjective justification we are talking about, then Sue and Twin Sue will 
indeed count as justificational duplicates; but, then, all we can establish via PC is that 
their justificatory processes are identical only from their—and not an objective, 
externally individuated—point of view, and this is a claim that is certainly compatible 
with content externalism. To be more precise, however—such that the content 
externalist will rest content—we should say that even though Sue and Twin Sue’s 
(internally supervening) belief-forming processes are identical, their (total) justificatory 
processes are different, because the input that is fed into their (identical, internal) belief-
forming processes is externally individuated and, thereby, different.33  
To the contrary, if it is objective justification we are talking about, content 
externalists will point out that we cannot even start using PC in the Twin Sue case, 
because they will deny its antecedent (i.e., that Sue and Twin-Sue are justificational 
duplicates). But then again, so will epistemic internalists, on the grounds that this is not 
the kind of justification they are interested in when they judge whether two individuals 
are justification duplicates, and so this is not the right way to read and employ PC. 
Therefore, we see that, in either case, we fail to establish incompatibility between 
epistemic internalism and content externalism on the basis of PC, and that this can only 
seem to be the case, when we do not properly distinguish between the two possible 
concepts of justification in play.     
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, we have been through two arguments for the incompatibility of epistemic 
internalism and content externalism: Bonjour’s Simple Accessibilist Argument and 
Chase’s Process Argument. Even though both arguments may initially appear 
compelling, they both seem to fail on grounds of illicit equivocation vis-à-vis ‘justification’. 
Specifically, both arguments seem to promiscuously jump back and forth between the 
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concepts of subjective and objective justification. This is a particularly meaningful 
distinction, which we have seen can be independently motivated on the basis of a wide 
variety of thought experiments within mainstream epistemology. In addition, however, it 
has also turned out to be especially useful for understanding what’s wrong with both 
Bonjour’s and Chase’s arguments—despite their initial plausibility—and, also, for 
reconciling the relevant underlying intuitions of all epistemic internalism, epistemic 
externalism and content externalism.   
 
University of Edinburgh 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
NOTES 
Acknowledgements: We thank two anonymous referees for the American Philosophical Quarterly for very 
helpful feedback on a previous draft of the paper. This article was written as part of the AHRC-funded 
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Eidyn research centre. 
1 ‘Externalism’ with respect to any property is tantamount to the claim that, as Lau & Deutch (2002, section 
1) put it: ‘whether an individual has that property or not depends, at least in part, on facts about the 
individual’s external environment’.   
2  We here refer to Access J-Internalism. For two influential defences of Access J-Internalism, see 
Chisholm (1977) and Bonjour (1985, ch. 2). For some helpful recent discussions of Access J-Internalism 
and its role in the wider epistemological externalism/internalism debate, see Steup (1999), Pryor (2001, 
section 3), Bonjour (2002), Pappas (2005), and Poston (2008). 
3  The locus classicus for defences of mentalism is Conee &  Feldman (2004). For a set of critical discussions 
of this proposal, see Dougherty (2011).  
4 In this paper we deal with the compatibility of epistemic internalism and content externalism and how the 
introduction of the subjective/objective justification distinction can elucidate our intuitions about it. For a 
general discussion of how the epistemic internalism/externalism debate maps on the 
internalism/externalism debate in philosophy of mind (as fueled by both content and active externalism 
(Clark & Chalmers 1998)) and an introductory treatment of the possible compatibilities and 
incompatibilities between all the involved views, see (Carter et al. 2014).  
5 Occasionally, we use the terms ‘Accessibilism’ and ‘Mentalism’ as shorthand for ‘Access J-Internalism’ 
and ‘Mentalist J-Internalism’, respectively. 
6 Bonjour (1992, p. 136) remarks that “The adoption of an externalist account of mental content would 
seem to support an externalist account of justification in the following way: if part or all of the content of a 
belief is inaccessible to the believer, then both the justifying status of other beliefs in relation to that 
content and the status of that content as justifying further beliefs will be similarly inaccessible, thus 
contradicting the internalist requirement for justification.” On this line of thinking, the content of my 
belief ‘X is F” where X is an externally individuated (i.e., wide) content is not reflectively accessible in such 
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a way that ‘X is F” can never, by the standards of J-Internalism, be something that justifies any other belief 
I have.  
7 See Chase (2001, p. 327) for a slightly different way of extracting Bonjour’s argument.  
8 Note that Williamson (2007, pp. 107-108) offers a similarly straightforward argument for the 
incompatibility of content externalism and epistemic internalism construed along mentalist lines, with the 
operative point being that Oscar and Twin Oscar can differ in their justified beliefs (given content 
externalism) despite being internal duplicates—a difference that Williamson takes to be incompatible with 
the mentalist claim that internal duplicates are justificational duplicates. It is interesting to note that 
Madison (2009, section 3, esp. pp. 180-182) objects to Williamson’s argument for the incompatibility of 
content externalism with Mentalist J-Internalism for essentially the same reasons (as we show) Chase sites 
in objecting to Bonjour’s argument for the incompatibility of content externalism with Access J-internalism. 
9 Madison (2009) engages primarily with an incompatibilist thesis submitted by Williamson (2007).  
10 For the seminal discussion of the new evil demon cases, see Lehrer & Cohen (1983; cf. Cohen 1984). 
There is a wealth of literature on new evil demon cases. For some of the key texts and recent discussions 
of this topic, see Bach (1985), Goldman (1988), Engel (1992), Bonjour &  Sosa (2003, 159-61), Neta &  
Pritchard (2007) and Littlejohn (2012). For an excellent survey of recent work on the new evil demon, see 
Littlejohn (2009). 
11 Compare here with Madison’s (2009, p. 182) point that the internal grounds relevant to epistemic J-
Internalism’s accessibility requirement are ‘what is necessarily in common between twins in Twin Earth 
scenarios’—viz., narrow content that is ‘subjectively indistinguishable’ in the two cases. Nevertheless, it is a 
difficult philosophical question how to articulate with precision what is subjectively indistinguishable and 
‘necessarily in common’ in these cases, in part because, on some views (e.g., Dretske (1996)), what is 
subjectively indistinguishable is also widely individuated, and so would not be ‘necessarily in common’ 
between the twins in Twin Earth scenarios. See here, along with Dretske (1996), Lycan (2001) for the view 
that qualia are wide, where qualia in Lycan’s (2001, p. 18) sense are ‘the introspectible qualitative 
phenomenal features that characteristically inhere in sensory experiences.’ Cf. Block’s (1990) ‘Inverted 
Earth’ argument. 
12 We should here note that Chase’s remarks about how the epistemic internalist’s intuition with respect to 
new evil demon cases can be used against Bonjour’s arguments are condensed to a few brief sentences in 
p. 238 of his 2001 paper. We cannot be entirely sure that the above analysis is exactly what Chase has in 
mind. As an anonymous referee has pointed out, however, it would indeed be very helpful to unpack what 
is supposed to be the input of new evil demon intuitions to the debate over the incompatibility of 
epistemic internalism and content externalism. Accordingly, even though the above 4 paragraphs may well 
stand on their own, we also hope that they are a charitable interpretation of Chase’s relevant remarks.  
13 Cf. Vahid (2003, pp. 101-103), however, for a criticism of Chase’s critique of Bonjour’s argument.  
14 Chase (2001, p. 239) articulates mentalism, which he calls J-Int2: in this way: ‘For all agents a1 and a2 and 
worlds w1 and w2, if a1 in w1 and a2 in w2 are identical in the internal physical constitutions on which their 
minds supervene, then a1 and a2 are identical in all respects relevant to the justification of their beliefs.’  
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15 We paraphrase the argument as Chase (ibid., p. 241) presents it. In particular, we are using “Mentalist J-
Internalism” where Chase is using his favoured articulation of Mentalist J-Internalism, which (as we noted 
in the previous footnote) he calls J-Int2. 
16 For the original presentation of the famous twin-earth thought experiment, see Putnam (1975). 
17 Chase (2001, pp. 241-242). See also Brueckner (2002, pp. 513-514) for a presentation of Chase’s 
argument for (2). 
18 Sue is reasoning through premises (e.g., 1 and 2) about water while Twin Sue is reasoning through 
premises about twater. 
19 Chase (ibid., p. 242). 
20 See also Brueckner (ibid., p. 514). 
21 One particular point of controversy has been how best to reply to the ‘generality problem’ for process 
reliabilism. See here Feldman (1985) and Conee and Feldman (1998). See also the bootstrapping and ‘easy 
knowledge’ problems (e.g., Vogel (2000) Cohen (2002)). 
22 Cautionary note: Running ahead of ourselves, this is not to claim that the two concepts of justification 
we are about to introduce—viz., objective and subjective justification—define the debate over epistemic 
internalism and externalism. That is, at least with respect to subjective justification, which seems to be the 
sort of justification that drives the internalist intuitions, there is no reason to assume that it can’t be given 
an externalist account. Subjective justification, in other words, may as well depend on both internal aspects 
of the agent’s (conscious) psychology and things that are external to it. For such a take on subjective 
justification see Greco (2005) and Palermos (2014).  
23 Similarly, Steve Fuller suggests that reliabilism in insufficient for knowledge on the grounds that it misses 
a very important aspect of our epistemically sentient nature: 
 
Anything calling itself “epistemology” — including “social epistemology — not concerned with the 
formation of beliefs and only examining reliable processes for arriving at the truth provides no more than an 
account of knowledge fit for androids not humans—that is to say, an epistemology where all the action 
occurs without the mediation of consciousness (Fuller 2012, p. 269). 
 
24 For anyone who may feel uncomfortable with the terms “objective” and “subjective” justification, two 
possible alternative terminologies that we have been trying out are “first person” and “third person” 
justification or “justification from one’s point of view” and “justification from a bird’s-eye point of view”. 
We here prefer, however, to stick with Greco’s terms, which are already available in the literature (and 
which, in comparison to the above alternatives, are more successful in capturing what we mean).  
25 Henceforth, the agent’s ‘(total) justificatory process’ will refer to the conjunction of the agent’s belief-
forming process and the input that is fed into it. Moreover, we take it that, in order for the (total) 
justificatory process to be reliable, it must be the case that both the agent’s belief-forming process is 
reliable and that its input is correct.  
26 (Pritchard 2009, 12); cf. Ginet (1975) and Goldman (1976) for earlier versions of this classic case. 
27 Cf. here, however, proponents of factive accounts of reasons, e.g., McDowell (1994). 
28 As Greco (2013, p. 22) has put the point, ‘[The protagonist in the classic barn façade case] believes from 
a disposition that is reliable relative to normal environments, but not relative to the environment he is in.’ 
See Greco’s ‘Working Farm’ case (Ibid. p. 23) for a fuller expression of this idea. For another expression of 
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the idea, couched in the language of perceptual-recognitional abilities, see Millar’s (2010, pp. 126-127) 
suggestion that: 
 
 ‘When Barney judges falsely in fake-barn territory he fails to exercise an ability to tell of certain structures 
that they are barns from the way they look. Indeed, he does not have the ability to tell structures around 
there that they are barns from the way they look. Of course, when he is there he does something like that he 
also does back home —judge of some structures that look like barns that they are barns—and in doing so he 
will sometimes judge correctly. But that does not amount to his being able to tell of the structures that they 
are barns from the way they look.’ 
 
29 To be clear here, nothing said in our diagnosis of the classic barn-façade cases contradicts the popular 
suggestion (see for example Pritchard (2005)) that environmental epistemic luck is incompatible with 
knowledge. That is, nothing suggested here indicates that cases whereby one’s belief is undermined by 
environmental epistemic luck, as is Pritchard’s gloss on the barn-façade case, cannot as well be cases where 
the agent is not objectively justified in virtue of the general kind of explanation being offered.  
30 See here Greco (2010, p. 149). 
31 Of course, there is another potential take on this case, according to which the relevant process is 
construed liberally as the process of choosing an algorithm on a whim to solve a math problem. If one 
were to construe the process this liberally (where the whimsicality is built in to the process), then the agent 
is neither subjectively nor objectively justified. However, and even though the thrust of our argument 
doesn’t turn on this point, we would also like to note that whimsicality seems to be conceptually connected 
with how things look from one’s point of view such that it may only pertain to facts about one’s subjective 
justification. 
32 Notice that one may here attempt to provide an account of subjective justification in terms of narrow 
content: If the justification relations between the narrow contents of one’s beliefs that make up one’s 
belief-forming process are appropriate—something which can be clearly assessed from one’s point of 
view—then one can be subjectively justified in holding the resulting proposition p, no matter whether p is 
indeed true or false. That is, narrowly individuated yet appropriate belief-forming processes allow one, 
from one’s point of view, to inculpably hold that p, even when one is massively deceived, such that p (and 
anything else that is fed into one’s narrowly individuated aspects of one’s belief-forming processes) is false. 
In other words, one’s subjective justification, and thereby epistemic responsibility, hinges only on the 
justification relations of the narrow contents of one’s beliefs. To the contrary, one’s objective (and thereby 
total justification) relies on the wide content of one’s beliefs. Accordingly, one cannot be fully justified in 
believing p, even if one’s subjective justification is impeccable. In order to be fully justified the wide content 
of the beliefs that participate in one’s belief-forming processes must be appropriate as well—that is, one 
must form one’s further beliefs on the basis of true beliefs.  
33 In relation to the previous note, then, one could claim again that subjective justification concerns only 
those aspects of one’s belief-forming processes that rely solely on one’s narrow contents. In order to judge 
whether one is fully justified, however, we also need to look at one’s objective justification: In other words 
we also need to check that one’s belief-forming processes operate on true beliefs, which means that we 
also need to check whether the wide content of one’s beliefs is appropriate as well. As a final note, 
however, we should mention that epistemic externalists will most likely resist the above approach to 
subjective justification on the grounds 1) that not all belief-forming processes operate on beliefs and 2) 
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that it relies too heavily on the agent’s conscious psychology in a way that it requires an implausibly active 
and reflective stance on the part of the agent that is absent in cases of perception or telling the sex of 
chickens apart.  
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